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Abstract 
1 Introduction 
In rail and road tunnels the occurrence of fire is the most dangerous scenario in 
terms of resulting emergencies [1]. 
     Therefore, the best practice and current regulations require measures and 
devices for prevention and protection, designed to reduce the probability of 
occurrence of fire (critical scenario) in tunnel and to control the effects in case of 
its occurrence [2]. 
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The paper proposes the main results obtained from the Quantitative Risk 
Analysis developed on an existing tunnel, according to the Ministerial Decree 
“Safety of Railway Tunnels” (October 28th 2005).  
     The fire produces the most severe scenario among the possible emergencies 
in confined area, thus the regulations in Europe and in Italy (Technical 
Specifications for Interoperability, Decision December 20th 2007, Ministerial 
Decree October 28th 2005) obligate to direct adoption of measures and devices 
for prevention and protection to reduce the probability of occurrence of this 
specific critical scenario and the containment of the fire effects.  
     To mitigate the damage, the difficulty of providing an effective external 
rescue in a short time involves supplementary safety measures aimed at 
improving the process of self-rescue. 
Keywords:   fire safety engineering,  emergency lighting, rail tunnel, safety 
electrical system, quantitative risk analysis. 
     In order to mitigate the damage, the difficulty of providing an effective 
external rescue in a short time involves supplementary safety measures aimed at 
facilitating the process of self-rescue activated as consequence of the fire 
scenario. 
     Accordingly, the safety electrical system, which supplies the emergency 
lighting and, where provided, also the internally illuminated exit signs, must be 
protected by faults, as far as possible, ensuring high reliability in case of 
impact/fire. 
     The case study shows the results of quantitative risk analysis developed for 
the specific risk assessment of a rail tunnel located in Italy and subject to the 
Decree “Safety of railway tunnels” (October 28th 2005). Current analysis and the 
resulting project were aimed at verifying the primary importance of 
the reliability of the safety electrical installations. Defining the infrastructural 
conditions of the tunnel, the performance of safety devices that influence the risk 
level of the system, was found to be the main safety parameter. 
     Derived observations are essentially suitable to all cases of collective 
transport systems in underground and they suggest a useful indication also for 
the case of road tunnels (that differ from rail tunnels by physical characteristics 
of fire and number of people exposed). 
     The Quantitative Risk Analysis highlights the influence of the performance of 
safety devices, in particular of emergency lighting, on the risk profile 
characteristic of the tunnel system.  
     The availability of technical solutions, that ensure the certified reliability of 
the performance in case of fire, allows us to design high safety standards at 
extremely affordable costs, where the alternatives are analytically evaluated. 
Thus, in some cases (such as this case study) a “not adaptable” system becomes 
compliant with the safety expectations of the community, as required by specific 
technical standards.  
1.1 Safety of rail tunnel: regulatory framework 
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The current regulations, relevant to the case of railway tunnels, are constituted by 
European Technical Specifications of Interoperability (TSI) and national 
regulations. 
In particular, for the purpose of regulatory requirement, the specific rules are: 
  Commission Decision, December 20th 2007 “Technical specification of 
interoperability relating to safety in railway tunnels in the trans-
European conventional and high-speed rail system” 
  Ministerial Decree “Safety of rail tunnels”, October 28th 2005 (Italian 
law) 
Both sources require a specific approach for the safety compliance of existing 
infrastructure and for the new tunnels, through a system of prescriptive and 
performance requirements. 
     The Decision refers to the “not systemic” approach of performance: the single 
railway subsystems guarantee minimum performance levels. For some of them, 
the safety subsystems defined, the TSI relate to EN 50126 (RAMS approach in 
the railway system) with the specific Safety Integrity Level (SIL), that define 
acceptable rates of unreliability. However, the definition of safety subsystems is 
unclear, especially with regard to infrastructure devices (and therefore the 
Electromotive Force and Emergency Lighting in tunnel). 
     The Decree proposes both minimum safety requirements and quantitative risk 
analysis. This approach provides an integrated project. The safety level is 
measured by quantitative indicators: Individual Risk (IR), which proposes 
normalization of expected value of fatalities by the number of exposed and 
Societal Risk, which evaluates Back-Cumulated risk Distribution (BCD). 
     The design of tunnel meets the safety requirements imposed by the standard 
where the risk indicators take a value compliant with predefined thresholds of 
acceptability according to ALARP criterion (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable). This approach allows the safety systemic design (also 
economically, with costs-benefits evaluation). 
2 Subsystems electrical safety:  
minimum performance requirements 
According to design of the safety systems the request of performance refers to 
criteria of good practice since a specific request of performance in terms of 
availability and reliability is not expected. For both the electrical (safety) devices 
and the emergency lighting systems the Decision requires that: “Electrical 
installations relevant for safety (Fire detection, emergency lighting, emergency 
communication and any other system identified by the Infrastructure Manager or 
contracting entity as vital to the safety of passengers in the tunnel) shall be 
protected against damage arising from mechanical impact, heat or fire.  
     The distribution system shall be designed to enable the system to tolerate 
unavoidable damage by (for example) energizing alternative links. The electrical 
supply shall be capable of full operation in the event of the loss of any one major 
element. Emergency lights and communication systems shall be provided with 90 
minutes backup”. 
     The Italian Decree defines the minimum performance required to the 
emergency lighting system: “The electrical components for supply of emergency 
systems (lighting and power) must be protected from damage caused by failures 
and accidents. 
     The installations of electric power supply must also provide suitable 
configurations or redundancy such as to ensure, in the event of single failure, the 
loss of short sections of the system, but not higher than 500 meters”. 
      The safety devices should ensure the high fault protection (i.e. high reliability 
of components and appropriate redundancy of system) in usual operation, and 
the high reliability performance (durability in terms of exposure to fire, and 
protection against short-circuit due to failures) under fire conditions. 
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3 Case study 
The evaluation of quantitative risk analysis is applied to railway tunnel (case 
study), whose geometric configuration, infrastructures and typical fire make it 
particularly difficult to verify the compliance with expected levels of safety. 
Thus, the comparative evaluation of alternative designs and traffic management 
is required. 
     The tunnel (see Figure 1) has a length of 2050 meters and complex 
infrastructural configuration: the end W consists of a subway station, to follow a 
first section (mono-directional tunnel) is about 250 meters in length (cross-
section of about 26 m2), then follow a room of about 100 meters and a section of 
about 1700 meters (mono-directional tunnel) on which an underground station is 
inserted. Actually the tunnel does not have an emergency lighting system. 
     The materials and solutions have not allowed a safety compliance 
configuration. Thus, innovative solutions in terms of safety management are 
necessary. 
 
Figure 1: Layout of  railway system. 
     The checking procedure, according to the Italian decree, highlights the need 
to adopt Extensive Risk Analysis (see Figure 2). 
 
3.1 Systems safety design A 
A platform that meets the minimum measures (0.5 m) of the Decree and an 
emergency lighting system were provided. 
     The compliance minimum design adopts a system of Electromotive Force and 
Emergency Lighting protected by a general fire, with cables compliant with the 
IEC 60331 
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 Figure 2: Checking procedure for safety evaluation of railway system. 
 
3.2 Systems safety design B 
According to the improved design, following the same geometric conditions of 
the infrastructure, the systems of Electromotive Force and Emergency Lighting 
show an enhanced fire performance as required by DIN 4102 and are able to 
keep thermal stresses higher than those foreseen by IEC 60331, especially for the 
wiring. All other conditions of the design A are unchanged. 
 
4 Quantitative risk analysis: relevance of safety systems 
The two described designs have been verified by developing a coupled process 
of simulation (fire and exodus). To determine the real conditions [5] of thermal 
and chemical harmfulness of exposed subjects and safety devices, a strategy of 
simulation in two steps was adopted [7]:  
  Modelling of the rolling stock set up with the real materials that are 
characterized by chemical properties and simulation of the likely fire 
curve of the train (minimum ignition). 
  The likely fire curve, derived from the small scale simulation, was 
compared with the experimental fire curve of Ingason [6] (see Figure 2) 
This approach allows us to characterize the fire behaviour of the rolling stock in 
use in the tunnel, following two steps (fire and exodus) of simulation that return 
likely the actual conditions of hazard. 
     In large-scale simulation (simulation of fire to the train in tunnel and 
simulation of exodus) the relevant characteristics to the development of the 
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 Figure 3: Comparative analysis of fire curves. 
 
hazard [8, 9] were highlighted. To the same geometrical conditions of the tunnel, 
is: 
  subsystem 1: availability, in the transient pre-flash over, of the 
electromotive force (emergency lighting system).  
  subsystem 2: availability, in the transient pre-flash over, of emergency 
lighting (conditioned on the availability of the subsystem 1). 
  subsystem 3: reliability, efficiency and effectiveness of emergency 
lighting in the transient post- flash over. 
Considering the portion of electric backbone, that supplies the emergency 
lighting, and its (small) distance from the train (length of section about 5 meters), 
the system and the devices are subject to thermal stresses (T = 300°C) after 16 
minutes from ignition. 
     Since the wiring is not protected from the fire there is a fast loss of system 
availability (250 meters of section) that results in the electric short circuit of 
device more thermally stressed. 
5 Results 
Figure 4 shows the trend of visibility (black line) less than 3 meters and the 
motion laws of exposed subjects in the case of Design A: the majority of 
exposed subjects are unable of self-rescue. 
     The solution of Design B, following the same conditions, leads to much better 
results (see Figure 5), since the expected duration of the devices performance is 
equal to about 46 minutes from the start of the emergency (30 minutes, 
according to the certification E30, from the start of thermal critical stress). 
     The traditional design (Design A) shows a deficit of safety, which is 
improved only by the expensive (and relatively not efficient) construction of a 
smoke extraction system, located in the room (fires localized in the first section 
of tunnel). 
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 Figure 4: Motion law – visibility less than 3 m (Design A). 
 
 
Figure 5: Motion law – visibility less than 3 m (Design B). 
     It is also required a radical decrease of the level of service and the 
replacement of the rolling stock. Thus the tunnel, according to results from the 
analysis, should be radically redesigned. 
     The number of fatalities associated with the solutions A and B is very 
different (as shown in Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Expected value of fatalities (Design A vs. Design B). 
 
     Given other variables relevant to the process of self-rescue and to the 
emergency management, the study has developed all scenarios of the Event Tree 
Analysis, by obtaining the probability and the corresponding damage [3, 4]. 
     The evaluation also allowed us to achieve the values of the risk indicators 
relating to both designs [10] (see Figures 7 and 8). 
     Based on these results a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was also made, so check 
the equivalent cost-effectiveness of the system of wiring (see Table 1). The 
analysis requires the choice of a conventional economic value to life (evaluated 
at €1,500,000) as risk indicators refer to the number of fatalities. 
 
 
Figure 7: Individual risk indicator (Design A vs. Design B). 
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 Figure 8: Societal risk – back cumulated distribution indicator (Design A vs. 
Design B). 
     The CBA applied to the devices, considering the amortization period of 25 
years, returns a judgment of absolute convenience (see Table 1). 
Table 1:  Cost-benefit analysis (amortization period: 25 years). 
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6 Conclusions 
Quantitative Risk Analysis shows that the system performance of Electromotive 
Force and Emergency Lighting, under fixed conditions of emergency scenario, is 
the primary determiner of risk level relating to the fire events. The evidence of 
this result is clear if you take methods of analysis “expert and scientifically 
sustainable”, by improving the traditional methodologies typical of the safety 
compliance analysis (ex NFPA 130 and Ministerial Decree 10/28/05). 
     The performance of safety devices (in particular, of emergency lighting) on 
the characteristic risk profile of the tunnel system are highlighted.  
     The availability of technical solutions ensures the certified reliability of the 
performance in case of fire. 
     High safety standards are obtained at extremely affordable costs. 
     The compliance with the safety expectations of the community, as required by 
specific technical, is verified. 
     In Italy, for both road and rail tunnels, safety targets that suggest safety 
requirements related to safety levels are fixed. 
     Operators must prove the achievements of the above safety targets by 
quantitative risk evaluation. 
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